Self-regulation in the Canadian securities industry: Funnel in, funnel out, or funnel away?

Abstract

The study analysed the processing of complaints against investment brokers and Dealer Members through the Investment Dealer Association (IDA) of Canada's disciplinary system between 2002 and 2007. The cases processed are discussed in relations to a misconduct funnel that examines the IDA's claim that it brought more complaints into the disciplinary system (funnel in), and shows how these complaints were reduced once they entered the system (funnel out), and deflected away from the criminal justice system (funnel away). The results indicate that the IDA was ineffective in disciplining its members because it was unable to handle the more serious and systemic industry problems. To respond to its impossible mandate, the IDA was involved in symbolic management to create a well-crafted image for public consumption of its effectiveness, notwithstanding its inability to do so in practice. The results further increased the call for cross-disciplinary research on securities market regulation.