A potential path forward beneath an old stalemate: Why unifying first-person and third-person methods is necessary for the development of an explanation of how the brain produces consciousness
Subject
Abstract
The central problem in cognitive science is explaining how the brain produces
consciousness. Many contend that consciousness is physical, and that therefore this causal
process can be explained by only studying the brain, while others object that consciousness is not
physical, and that therefore any physicalist account will necessarily fail to include the most
important component of this causal process: consciousness. I argue that this debate, as it is
currently constructed, is irresolvable because we do not yet have a definitive understanding of
the physical, and that underlying it, is a methodological debate concerning whether or not this
causal process can be explained by solely using third-person methods. In support of the antiphysicalists,
I argue that consciousness cannot be directly observed from a third-person
perspective, and that it can only be directly observed from a first-person perspective. While one
cannot directly perceive other minds, it is only rational, I contend, to believe that individuals who
possess brains similar to one’s own also possess experiences similar to one’s own. Furthermore, I
argue that this perspectival distinction proves that in order to develop an explanation of this
causal process, it is necessary for third-person methods to be used in conjunction with rigorous
first-person methods. Specifically, I contend that how experiences are structured ought to be
studied in relation to their correlating neurological structures, for by identifying such structural
correlations, a more intuitive understanding of why particular brain states produce particular
experiences can begin to develop.